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CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS:
LEGAL, RACIAL, AND MORAL CODES IN Go Down, Moses
Thadious M. Davis*
In 1937, just a few years before Faulkner was to begin the stories
compiling Go Down, Moses (1942), Bertram Doyle stated: "Tradi-
tion .. .assigns the Negro his place in the South, law defines
it, sentiment supports it, custom and habit continue it, and prej-
udice maintains it in those instances where it seems to be break-
ing down." His conclusion is a linguistically balanced restatement
of common knowledge. During the early 1930's, in preparation
for her book After Freedom: A Cultural Study of the Deep South
(1939), Hortense Powdermaker observed that in Indianola,
Mississippi, whites believed that blacks were "innately inferior"
and "by nature" fit only for servile employment; corresponding-
ly, blacks understood that all aspects of their lives were affected
by "the racial situation and the system with which it is interlocked,"
so that each black person within the community believed "that
he must watch his behavior in the company of Whites, lest he
give offense and suffer for it." Although Powdermaker spent two
years completing field research in Mississippi, she, too, concludes
the known: that law and custom confirmed the subservient place
of blacks; that a system of swift punishment for real and imagined
grievances either under the legal system or the racial codes con-
trolled the lives of blacks and the thinking of whites.
Powdermaker, an anthropologist, and Doyle, a sociologist,
reiterate a commonplace: the pervasive separate and lower place
of blacks in Mississippi life during the same period in which
Faulkner, as he revealed in letters to Robert Haas, had already
written "four stories about niggers" and intended to "build onto
[them] ...write some more." By May 1, 1941, Faulkner had
written a collection of stories which had become, he said, "a
volume, collected short stories, general theme being relationship
between white and Negro races here." Faulkner's collection already
had the title, Go Down, Moses, as well as much of the material
for inclusion. Yet, it was not until he expanded the stories "A
Point of Law" and "Gold is not Always" into "The Fire and the
Hearth," and added the fourth section of "The Bear," that he
clarified the dominant vision of the work, a vision which differen-
tiates it from just another novel about "race relations," and from
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even such distinguished novels as those by two other Mississip-
pians, Night Fire (1946) by Edward Kimbrough and The Voice
at the Back Door (1956) by Elizabeth Spencer.
Faulkner chose the interfamilial black-white relationships
developed over a spectrum of time, from the pre-Civil War period
to the World War II era, extending through three generations of
whites and four of blacks. However, at the base of the novel and
those relationships is the concept of property as it relates to human
rights and to the rights of the individual. In part, Faulkner ex-
amines the strong~belief in the right to property as a basic right,
and his characters, both black and white, define self and others
in terms of the right to property and the use of property, but readers
define the moral core of the novel according to the characters'
attitudes toward property. The idealogical context inspiring
Faulkner's novel stems mainly from the existence of chattel slavery
in the South rather than from philosophical treatises on property.
He employs property and the rights which arise from ownership
of private property to underscore and to illuminate not only black-
white relationships, but also fundamental questions about the value
and meaning of the human being.' He frames his questions, what
does it mean to be human and what are the responsibilities as well
as the rights of the human being, from the perspective of the white
southerner in a specified environment, who possesses, owns, in-
herits, and holds "property," and whose right to dispose of it as
he chooses is protected by law.
In this discussion, I assume the primacy of four themes already
delineated by other Faulkner critics: freedom, bondage or enslave-
ment, the ritual hunt or search, and love.2 My main focus of at-
tention is to Faulkner's use of legal, racial, and moral codes in
the thematic and structural design of Go Down, Moses. Accord-
ing to Faulkner's logic in the novel, these codes are all manifesta-
tions of or responses to "property" and its attendant "rights," and
they are the cause of the complexities within the society he depicts.
Legal codes, those practices of both custom and statute con-
stituting the authorities, interact with racial codes, those beliefs
and attitudes regulating interpersonal conduct between whites and
blacks, in defining the place of individuals within the society
depicted in the novel. In Go Down, Moses, moral codes, those
virtues, values, and ideals, often abstract and intuitive, operate
on a higher level of awareness and authority with regard to the
1. Not surprisingly women are largely absent from the novel because they rarely own property in this
world, though from a series of legislative acts women in Mississippi had their right to property protected by law.
2. See, for example, Lawrance Thompson, William Faulkner: An Introduction and Interpretation (1967),
and Olga Vickery, The Novels of William Faulkner: A Critical Interpretation (1964).
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meaning of the human being and intersect with legal and racial
codes to define humanity in individual and societal terms. At the
point of convergence, the three codes bring together both past
and present experience - words, thoughts, and deeds - to create
the ideological core of the work, and essentially its complexity.
However, because the three codes also exist in diffusion throughout
the text, they function to establish individual priorities within social
mandates that form the separate patterns of meaning as well. Legal,
racial, and moral codes, then, are all single keys to meaning, to
the various motifs and themes, but together they assert a positive
capacity to determine and modify thought as well as behavior,
and thereby bring about social change. Nevertheless, only per-
sonal change occurs within the novel, because the dynamic re-
alignment of values, attitudes, practices, and beliefs necessary
for reformation in a static society takes place only as potential
within a few isolated experiences.'
At the static center is Lucius Quintus Carothers McCaslin, old
Carothers, who in the 1780's moved from Carolina with slaves,
purchased land from a Chickasaw, and established a plantation.
Similar to Thomas Sutpen in Faulkner's Absalom! Absalom!
(1936), Carothers McCaslin dominates the narrative present
though he has been dead for nearly one hundred years. His name
is borrowed from Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, the
Mississippi lawyer, politician, and later justice of the United States
Supreme Court, who began his career in 1849 after moving to
Faulkner's hometown, Oxford. Much like Mr. Justice Lamar, the
fictional L. Q. C. achieves influence and power, but his is primari-
ly over his descendants, two of who provide the dual lens through
which old Carothers assumes substance and meaning. The two
are his grandsons, the white Isaac McCaslin and the black Lucas
Beauchamp. Although both are entitled to a bequest from their
grandfather on their twenty-first birthday, Ike renounces his
patrimony, the McCaslin plantation, whereas Lucas asks for his
inheritance, a thousand dollars. Their actions reflect their different
attitudes towards Carothers, as well as their different degrees of
removal from the actual experience of Carothers.
Born in 1874, Lucas has assimilated the experience of his grand-
father as accomplishment and assertion of manhood. He shares
with McCaslin (Cass) Edmonds, Carothers's nephew, the vision
of an ancestor who,
3. My assumption is that the society in Go Down, Moses is static rather than stable.
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saw the opportunity and took it, bought the land, took the land . no matter how, held
it to bequeath, no matter how, out of the old grant, the first patent, when it was a wilderness
of wild beasts and wilder men, and cleared it, translated it into something to bequeath
to his children, worthy of bequeathment for his descendants' ease and security and pride
and to perpetuate his name and accomplishments.
Though his own father was one of Carothers's slaves, Lucas
believes in the ethical right of ownership and in the principle of
occupation making the right to property. He sees industry in ac-
quiring land and power in holding it, yet he discounts both need
for the land and labor performed on it. The latter, of course, ap-
plies most directly to the McCaslin blacks, as viable claims to
property and ownership.
On his twenty-first birthday, then, Lucas asks for the money
left for his father, Tomey's Turl, old Carothers McCaslin's son
by his slave daughter. He declares: "'I'm a man now. I can do
what I want. I want to know that I can go when I decide to."'
The money provides him with the opportunity for choice; he can
choose to stay or to leave the McCaslin plantation because money
establishes his manhood in economic independence. However,
his acceptance of the money as a legacy acknowledges old
Carothers's right to property and to bequeathal of it. In asking
for his inheritance, Lucas also asks that a contractual obligation
be met. His understanding of rights is primarily in terms of the
plantation as a business derived from acquisition, possession, and
dispensation, which are protected by law.
"The Fire and the Hearth," the chapter introducing Lucas, relies
upon both legal and business words and phrases, such as "inter-
dict," "reprieve," "justice," "partnership," "recompense," "Law"
(with a capital "L"), "revenue," "money," "competitor," and
"business," all of which mark Lucas's conception of himself as a
man cut from the same cloth as his grandfather. The main idea
of the introductory section has to do with Lucas Beauchamp's at-
tempts to entrap his competitor, George Wilkins, his daughter's
suitor, just as five years before he had taken care of another com-
petitor in the illegal business of running a still. That former com-
petitor is at the present moment in the state penal farm at
Parchman, thanks to Lucas who plots to have George suffer the
same fate.
From the beginning, Lucas uses the law for revenge and for
the control and elimination of his competition, which he ac-
complishes with the unwitting assistance of Roth Edmonds, the
white owner of the land that Lucas has farmed for forty-five years.
Thus, legal terms abound in the narrative introducing Lucas;
moreover, much of the section uses the language of contracts law,
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and several of the main ideas are related to contractual obliga-
tions, whether those obligations stem from the authority of "the
Law" (again with a capital "L") or from that of the head of the
family (Lucas himself), or from that of the plantation system.4
Lucas, whose values regarding competition and business and
money have been shaped by the organization of the plantation,
as well as by the conception of patrimony, operates within an ethics
of business. His code of honor and of conduct stems from his
belief in the necessity of manhood, the primacy of age, and the
legitimacy of acquisition, all of which are partly formed out of
the plantation system and partly out of Lucas's response to the
place of blacks in the plantation world. For instance, he perceives
his rights in terms of competition, as when in his youth he deter-
mined that he must kill his kinsman Zack Edmonds, the white
man who had appropriated Lucas's wife to care for his motherless
infant. Lucas tells Zack, "'You tried to beat me. And you wont
never, not even when I am hanging dead from the limb this time
tomorrow with the coal oil still burning, you wont never.'" Lucas
knows the immediate meaning of compensatory justice for blacks,
but he knows also, that if he is to avail himself of justice, he must
do so in the terms understood and practiced by whites, because
only those demand respect. And Zack's response is a confirma-
tion of Lucas's ability to circumvent the codes suppressing blacks
and to use them to assert himself: "'By God... I never thought
to ever pass my oath to a nigger."' In the next generation of
McCaslin-Edmondses, Zack's son Roth recognizes the source of
Lucas's power: "He's more like old Carothers than all the rest of
us put together .... He is both heir and prototype simultaneously
of all the geography and climate and biology which sired old
Carothers and all the rest of us and our kind.... "(Faulkner's
italics)
Much like his grandfather, Lucas capitalizes on the law and
on social practice for power. When he recognizes that the offend-
ing George Wilkins might be useful to his search for gold he
believes buried on the plantation, Lucas abandons his plan to send
George to prison:
So George Wilkins was reprieved without knowing his... danger... [H]e even thought
of taking George into partnership on a minor share basis to do the actual digging; indeed,
not only to do the actual work but as a sort of justice, balance, libation to Chance and
Fortune, since if it had not been for George, he would not have found the single [gold] coin.
4. Roth Edmonds as the representative of that system runs the business of the plantation and controls the
comnmissary, both of which have contractual authority over the lives of black sharecroppers like Lucas.
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Lucas's sense of justice extends mainly to what is fair to himself.
In whatever arrangements he makes, and in whichever linguistic
pattern he chooses, he reveals his concern for what he himself
deserves due to his position as the oldest living McCaslin descen-
dant living on the plantation, his wisdom about financial and
business matters, and his position as head of the Beauchamp fami-
ly. Therefore, he dismisses the thought of sharing with George.
[B]efore it even had time to become an idea. He, Lucas Beauchamp ...who actually
remembered Buck and Buddy [Old Carothers's twin sons] in the living flesh, older than
Zack Edmonds even if Zack were still alive, almost as old as Old Isaac who in a sense,
say what a man would, had turned apostate to his name and lineage by weakly relinquishing
the land which was rightfully his to live in town on the charity of his great-nephew; -
he, to share one jot, one penny of the money which old Buck and Buddy had buried almost
a hundred years ago, with an interloper. . . whose very name was unknown in the coun-
try twenty-five years ago .... Never. Let George take for his recompense the fact that
he would not have to go to the penitentiary to which Roth Edmonds would probably have
sent him even if the Law did not.
Although he may exaggerate his ability to turn situations to his
best advantage, Lucas sees himself both as a worthy descendant
of Old Carothers and as protected by that postition despite his
race. Within his limited situation, he negotiates power in the man-
ner he associates with his ancestor.
At the same time, however, Lucas is aware that the plantation
system represented by his grandfather entraps all blacks and
negates his individual manhood. For example, he has to ask before
depositing his inheritance: "'Will the bank keep it for a black man
same as for a white?"' And after his confrontation with Zack, he
poses an even more significant question, which renders in
microcosm the place assigned to blacks and the prerogative assured
whites: "'How to God . .. can a black man ask a white man to
please not lay down with his black wife? And if he could ask it,
how to God can the white man promise that he wont?"' Lucas
understands the restrictions placed upon him by the racial codes
of his society. He even admits that the "law" is "rich white lawyers
and judges and marshalls talking to one another around their proud
cigars, the haughty and powerful of the earth." Nonetheless, he
still believes that as "the oldest living McCaslin descendant still
living on the heredity land" he can circumvent racial restrictions
by evoking his connection to Carothers McCaslin and his power
over the land. Despite his belief, he cannot escape the truth of
the historical condition and treatment of blacks in Mississippi,
and its repercussions in his own life.
Although as early as June, 1818, in Harry and Others v. Decker
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& Hopkins, (concerning a Petition for Freedom),' the Supreme
Court of Mississippi ruled that "slavery is condemned by reason
and the laws of nature," 6 by 1821, the court had accepted the
legality of slavery in Mississippi, while maintaining that slaves
were "reasonable and accountable beings." 7 The court's decision
in State v. Jones,8 the case of a white man accused of murdering
a slave not only condemned the murderer to death by hanging
on July 27, 1821, but also established the legal rights of the slave
in Mississippi;' Justice Joshua G. Clark, the first chancellor of
the state, wrote the decision:
Has the slave no rights, because he is deprived of his freedom? He is still a human being,
and possesses all those rights, of which he is not deprived by the positive provisions of
law, but in vain shall we look for any law passed by the enlightened and philanthropic
legislature of this state, giving even to the master, much less to a stranger, power over
the life of a slave. Such a statute would be worthy of the age of Draco and Caligula, and
would be condemned by the unanimous voice of the people of this state, where, even cruelty
to slaves . . . meets with universal reprobation."
The slave, then, a "reasonable and accountable being," was de-
prived of his freedom, but allowed "all those rights of which he
is not deprived by the positive provision of law." Unfortunately,
under the "positive provision of law," slaves were increasingly
denied rights, because enslavement by its very nature forced them
into a sub-category of human beings and made them vulnerable
to legal encroachments upon their rights.
By 1860, the year of Lincoln's election and one year after John
Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry, some of the laws controlling slaves
in Mississippi included prohibitions against marriages,11 contact
with free blacks," defense or testimony against whites, 3 learn-
ing to read or write," and leaving a plantation without a pass."s
These were added to numerous existing communally sanctioned
customs as well as state and local laws, such as that forbidding
the freeing of slaves by will. 6 While chattel slavery in Mississip-
pi neither existed technically after the January 1, 1863, Eman-
cipation Proclamation nor existed legally after the thirteenth
5. 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 36 (1818).
6. Id. at 42.
7. State v. Jones, I Miss. ( Walker) 83, 84 (1820).
8. Id. at 83.
9. Id. at 86.
10. Id. at 84-85.
It. Miss. REV. CODE ch. XI, art. 1 (1857).
12. Id. at ch. XXXIII, art. 51.
13. Id. at art. 62.
14. Id. at art. 51.
15. Id. at art. 45.
i6. id. at art. 9.
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amendment to the Constitution, legislative attempts to deny blacks
their freedom continued. The Black Code of 1865,17 for exam-
ple, was as intent upon the denial of rights as earlier slave codes,
such as those of 1857, had been. Although the 1865 codes granted
some rights to blacks, such as the right to sue or be sued,18 to
testify in state courts, 9 to marry legally,2" and to own personal
property, 2 these codes also attempted to restrict the liberties of
freed blacks, and to deny them justice under the existing legal
system. For example, young black children were subject to "bind-
ing out" as unpaid apprentices, with their former masters being
allowed to choose them for service; or for example, any blacks
without a job or home by January 1, 1866, were fined as vagrants,
but the fine could be paid by hiring out, again with the former
masters receiving preference for their services.' In addition, blacks
could not bear arms or own guns,2" could not rent farm land, "
and could not perform certain forms of work without a license. 5
Even though the vast majority of the Black Code was repealed
in 1870,6 the lasting result was that blacks were kept in a posi-
tion of inferiority - socially, economically, and for the most part
legally as well.
Despite Mississippi's ratification of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments in 1870,27 oppressive conditions continued and essen-
tially prepared for a system of "Jim Crow" laws following the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890. These laws defined the rights
of blacks as different from those of whites, instituted racial codes
which continued to stamp blacks as inferior and justified their ex-
clusion from full access to justice and equality. Specifically after
the 1883 United States Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 was unconstitutional , recreational, educational and
public facilities became increasingly segregated by race between
the late 1880's and the turn of the century. In 1890, the twenty-
fifth anniversary of Appomattox, when 744,749 Mississippians
were black and 544,851 white, the state enacted the 1890 Con-
17. There is no Black Code per se, but the statutes of 1865 dealing with the recently freed Negroes are
known as such.
18. 1865 Miss. Laws ch. IV, § 1.
19. id. at § 4.
20. Id. at § 3.
21. Id. at § 1.
22. Id. at ch. v, § 1.
23. Id. at ch. XXIII, § 1.
24. Id. at ch. IV, § 1.
25. Id. at § 5.
26. 1870 Miss. Laws ch. X, § 2.
27. Id. at chs. CCXCIV-CCXCV.
28. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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stitution, which stated in article III, section 5: "All political power
is vested in, and derived from, the people; all government of right
originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and
is instituted solely for the good of the whole."29 Nevertheless, the
constitution virtually dismissed blacks from any consideration in
"the good of the whole" by its article XII, "Franchise." Called
the "Mississippi Plan," the article introduced prerequisites for
voting: proof of having paid taxes for the two-year period
preceding an election;3" residency requirements for the state and
district;31 a uniform poll tax of two dollars;32 proof of never hav-
ing been convicted of certain crimes3 (e.g., bigamy, perjury, theft,
and burglary); and an "understanding clause," which required the
reading and interpreting of any designated section of the 1890
Constitution.3" Moreover, section 245 of article XII provided,
"Electors in municipal elections shall possess all the qualifications
herein prescribed, and such additional qualifications as may be
provided by law . . . ." This provision opened the way for further
local restrictions against prospective black voters.
Upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Sproule v.
Fredericks,6 and by the United States Supreme Court in Williams
v. Mississippi,7 two years after the Court made the "separate but
equal" ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson,"8 the "Mississippi Plan" not
only avoided the fifteenth amendment, but also effectively disen-
franchised blacks and re-established white supremacy, just as the
Forest Register, a Mississippi newspaper, had proclaimed in its
masthead for years: "A white man in a white man's place. A black
man in a black man's place. Each according to the 'eternal fitness'
of things." Although Justice John Marshall Harlan had dissented
from the Supreme Court's 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson finding by
stating: "Our Constitution is color-blind .... The arbitrary separa-
tion of citizens on the basis of race is a badge of servitude wholly
inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution," 9 his position had little impact
in Mississippi or elsewhere in the United States. From the 1890's
29. Miss. CONST. art. III, § 5.




34. Id. at art. XII, § 244 (1890, repealed 1975).
35. Id. at art. XII. § 245.
36. 69 Miss. 898, I1 So. 472 (1892).
37. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. Id. at 559, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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through the early decades of the twentieth century that Faulkner
depicts in Go Down, Moses blacks in the state were legally con-
trolled by a caste position rather than slavery, and despite the four-
teenth or fifteenth amendment, they existed in racial degradation
and economic deprivation. This inferior position is the one from
which Lucas Beauchamp would distance himself by claiming the
model of his white grandfather's power and authority wrought from
ownership.
Lucas is forced, however, to accept a different authority when
his wife Molly threatens to divorce him because of his obsession
with acquisition, with obtaining buried money from the land.
Unlike Lucas, Molly believes that the land belongs to God who
has the power of authority over it and that, therefore, it cannot
belong to any human being: "'Because God say, "What's rendered
to My earth, it belongs to Me unto I resurrect it. And let him
or her touch it and beware .... Both in Molly's explanation and
in the spiritual "Go Down, Moses" from which Faulkner took his
title, there is a sense of God's power to seek retribution for trans-
gressions against His will, His law. Though she speaks about the
buried treasure, Molly also reminds Lucas that the land is de-
filed by human exploitation, and she draws him away from the
egocentric and destructive ways of his grandfather. Ironically,
however, she also causes him to abandon his hopes for a change
in his condition, and to acquiesce to his subordinate place as a
black on the McCaslin plantation.
Lucas is not ultimately free; his life has progressed in a certain
prescribed way in spite of his efforts to make it otherwise, and
at sixty-seven, he cannot change it, as he admits: "'Man has got
three score and ten years on this earth .... He can want a heap
in that time and a heap of what he can want is due to come to
him, if he just starts soon enough. I done waited too late to start."'
It is not within his power to remake his life and receive his share
of the spoils of the earth. He and Molly and Roth will remain
tied to one another as social creatures in a particular social world.
The burden of their past is stronger than the possibilities for a
reordered future. Lucas's acquiescence is finally to his legal union
with Molly, to his moral responsibility toward her, and to his in-
herited place on the McCaslin-Edmonds plantation. His action
signals a necessary renunciation of egocentric dreams, but the cost
is his hope for a different future.
Lucas's white kinsman Isaac (Ike) McCaslin equates the ex-
perience of their grandfather with possession of the land and of
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slaves. However, Ike's equation is a negative one. He reasons that
when old Carothers bought the land, he
believed [that] he had tamed and ordered it for the reason that the human beings he held
in bondage and in the power of life and death had removed the forest from it and in their
sweat scratched the surface of it ... in order to grow something ... which could be
translated back into the money he who believed he had bought it had had to pay to get
it and hold it and a reasonable profit too: and for which reason old Carothers McCaslin,
knowing better, could raise his children, his descendants and heirs, to believe the land
was his to hold and bequeath since the strong and ruthless man has a cynical foreknowledge
of his own vanity and pride and strength and a contempt for all his get ....
Ike envisions his grandfather as a ruthless man who misap-
propriates the land and abuses human beings because he assumes
the right to property, the plantation itself as well as its chattel
slaves.
Born in 1867, Ike's personal history coincided with the difficult
period of rebuilding and reconstructing the post-war South: "1874
the boy; 1888 the man, repudiated denied and free; 1895 and hus-
band but no father, unwidowed but without a wife, and found long
since that no man is ever free and probably could not bear it if
he were. ... " At twenty-one, Ike repudiates the plantation tradi-
tion of his grandfather by renouncing his birthright, ownership
of the McCaslin land, because he believes that God
created man to be His overseer on earth and to hold suzerainty over the earth and the
animals on it in His name, not to hold it for himself and his descendants inviolable title
forever, generation after generation, to the oblongs and squares of the earth, but to hold
the earth ... in the communal anonymity of brotherhood, and all the fee He asked was
pity and humility and sufferance and endurance and the sweat of his face for bread.
He adopts his terms from the language of plantation life: God as
master, man as overseer, earth and animals as dominated or con-
trolled. Nevertheless, Ike acts in philosophical opposition to the
ethics of keeping blacks in bondage, and in opposition to "the very
race which for two hundred years had held them bondage and
from which for another hundred years not even a bloody civil
war would have set them completely free." As a result, he rejects
ownership of any personal goods in order to free himself from
even the smallest accumulation of property, which would be a
reminder of his heritage. By divesting himself of ownership, Ike
attempts to expiate the sins of his grandfather and the "whole plan-
tation in its mazed and intricate entirety ...the whole edifice
intricate and complex and founded upon injustice and erected by
ruthless rapacity and carried on even yet with at times downright
savagery not only to human beings but to valuable animals too."
The point that Ike repeatedly considers is that his grandfather
acts upon a belief that he has the right to do what he wishes with
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his property. The key words in "Was," the chapter introducing
Ike, are references to this recurrent concern: "bequestor," "in-
heritor," "title," "patent," "owned," "property," "will," and "land."
But these words do not fully signify what old Carothers's pro-
prietarian right has encompassed: his begetting of a child upon
his own slave daughter; his alloting a thousand dollar cash legacy
to his slave son to be paid by his legitimate sons and heirs, the
twins, Amodeus (Buddy) and Theophilus (Buck). Nor do they
allow for the moral conclusion that Ike reaches: that Carothers
values property, but not human life; that he finds dignity in posses-
sion, but not in the human beings possessed.
Isaac McCaslin discovers and verifies in reading the plantation
ledgers the truth of his grandfather's values and power; he intuits
and reasons the actual facts of use and ownership, and with these
the superiority and dominance of his white relative over others.
The ideal of natural rights in a natural world is not possible once
the land has been held by the Chickasaw, occupied by them, and
thus giving them possession and the right to assume ownership
of it, until finally they sell the land to Carothers McCaslin. The
ledgers, records of the plantation commissary, provide Ike with
one truth about his grandfather's treatment of his chattel, his in-
cestuous relationship with his daughter, which is a transgression
of the natural law Ike espouses.
Perhaps even more significant is that he discovers that the
ledgers themselves are not simply a record of purchases, expen-
ditures, debits, and credits for the plantation, but that they are,
in effect, an index to the codes of the land and the society: "strong
as truth and impervious as evil and longer than life itself and
reaching beyond record and patrimony." As an index, the ledgers
contain the regulations, the rules, the contracts, and the customs
of the plantation owners in regard to their property. Essentially,
the evidence Ike needs to understand his heritage is in,
that chronicle ... a whole land in miniature, which multiplied and compounded was the
entire South, twenty-three years after surrender and twenty-four from emancipation -
that slow trickle of molasses and meal and meat, of shoes and straw hats and overalls,
of plowlines and collars and heel-bolts and buckheads and clevises, which returned each
fall as cotton - the two threads frail as truth and impalpable as equators yet cable-strong
to bind for life them who made cotton to the land their sweat fell on.
The phrase "threads frail as truth . . . yet cable-strong," recur-
rent especially in "The Bear," is suggestive of the language in
Jeremy Bentham's discussion of law and property in Principles
of the Civil Code (1802): "That which in the natural state was
an almost invisible thread, in the social state becomes a cable.
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Property and law are born together. Before laws were made there
was no property; take away laws and property ceases."4 0
Ike cannot accept the legacy of his grandfather, because he has
a different conception of himself as a human being. He will respect
the land and its inhabitants, but he will not accept ownership of
the land, for unlike old Carothers, Ike acknowledges that harm
has been done to others in the securing of his birthright:
[Hie couldn't speak even to McCaslin [his older first-cousin Cass], even to explain his
repudiation, that for which to him too, even in the act of escaping (and maybe this was
the reality and the truth of his need to escape) was heresy: so that in escaping he was
taking more of that evil and unregenerate old man who could summon, because she was
his property, a human being because she was old enough and female, to his widower's
house and get a child on her and then dismiss her because she was of an inferior race ....
Whereas Carothers neither recognizes the wrong that he does nor
admits responsibility for the damages he causes in the lives of
his slaves, Ike can only acknowledge by repudiation; he cannot
escape.
Though Sam Fathers, the black Indian who was himself sold
by his father Ikkemotubbe, sets Ike free by teaching him the
positive values of the natural world, Sam Fathers cannot provide
a place for Ike in society. Though Cass Edmonds teaches Ike the
practical realities of plantation life, Cass cannot join those prac-
ticalities to Ike's ideals. Buck and Buddy McCaslin, his father and
uncle, show Ike by their example that they object to the treat-
ment of slaves; that is, they quarter their slaves in the "big house,"
old Carothers's "tremendous abortive edifice scarcely yet out of
embryo," and they refuse to secure the slaves at night, or to have
slaves build a house for them and perform the household chores.
Nevertheless, Buck and Buddy cannot show Ike how to change
the plantation system. Ike cannot escape the complexities of ethical
and moral conduct in a society whose laws reinforce the ruthless
proprietorship of his grandfather and reduce his father's and
uncle's circumvention of ownership to humorous eccentricity. The
past with its living legacies combines with reason, intuition, and
emotion in the present to destroy both innocence and simplicity
and to deflate moral action and ideals. The reality is that the land
is not, as Ike had supposed, "held and used in common and fed
from and on and would continue to use in common without regard
to color or titular ownership." The ledgers and Ike's experience,
40. 2 William Tait, The Works ofJeremy Bentham 297 (1843) (quoting J. Bentham, Principles of the Civil
Code (1982)).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
as well as that of his grandfather, deny the image of community
and brotherhood without regard to race or ownership.
The land is divided and owned. The owners declare, as one
Mississippi legislator did in 1840, that "the institution of domestic
slavery ... [is] not a curse, but a blessing, as the legitimate con-
dition of the African race"; or as the Supreme Court of the United
States did in the 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,1 that it
is "fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race"
that blacks have "no rights which the white man [is] bound to
respect"; 42 or as another Mississippi legislator did in 1865, that
the negro exists for the special object of raising cotton, rice and sugar for the whites, and
that it is illegitimate for him to indulge, like other people. in pursuit of his own happiness
in his own way. Although it is admitted that he has ceased to be the property of a master,
it is not admitted that he has the right to become his own master.
Against such division and ownership, Ike has only a broad social
idealism. He has rejected emotional ties along with his inheritance.
Unlike Lucas Beauchamp who loves Molly and accepts his respon-
sibility toward her, Ike fails to respond to individuals. He forgets
that even the custodians of the earth have an obligation to assume
responsibility for their caretaking, just as in the system of owner-
ship which he opposes and repudiates, owners must assume
responsibility for their actions. While he may have followed Fon-
siba, the daughter of Tomey's Turl, to Arkansas in order to give
her a share of her father's inheritance, or traced Tennie's Jim to
Tennessee to give him money as well, Ike does not understand
that he can protect blacks neither with idealism alone nor with
money alone, given the realities of their subjugation and oppres-
sion. Although his intention is to give his black kin their rightful
share of the property left to them by their father's failure to ac-
cept a monetary legacy from his father, old Carothers, Ike does
not recognize that his action replicates his grandfather's leaving
a thousand dollars to Tomey's Turl, an act which Ike himself con-
demned: "So I reckon that was cheaper than saying My son to
a nigger. . .. "He acts out of a sense of compensatory justice,
but the compensation or reparation is, as it was for his grand-
father, only money. While Ike indeed feels a moral obligation
to compensate for injustice, he does so with money, since prop-
erty retains meaning for him. So central is his belief in the negative
meaning of property that he cannot rid himself of measurement
in terms of it. When Lucas goes to claim his inheritance from
41. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
42. Id. at 407.
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Ike, his request and his presence force Ike to reflect on his own
situation: "Fifty dollars a month. He knows that's all. That I reneg-
ed, cried calf-rope, sold my birthright, betrayed my blood, for
what he too calls not peace but obliteration, and a little food."
He suspects that despite his high ideals, his action has resulted
in "obliteration." In effect, he brings no meaningful change into
his environment because he has given up his opportunity to sus-
tain contact with it.
The climax of the novel may be in the chapter "The Bear" with
Ike's discovery of the extent of the moral transgression recorded
in the plantation ledgers and with his resulting decision to act ac-
cording to a higher moral law or authority, but the denouement
occurs in "Go Down, Moses," the chapter in which the systems
of law and the residue of property in the twentieth-century socie-
ty come openly into play.
The spiritual, "Go Down, Moses," which lends its title directly
to the chapter, identifies three levels of authority and sources of
laws affecting the lives of human beings. The Lord speaks, "Go
down, Moses,/ Way down in Egyptland/ Tell old Pharaoh/ To
let my people go." His command to Moses evokes the highest
authority, a transcendent spiritual and moral authority. Moses,
his servant, is the human agent, a moral representative and a
divinely-appointed leader. Pharaoh, ruler of the land and represen-
tative of the state, is both social law-maker and moral. law-breaker.
The spiritual suggests the right of challenging his legal authority
on the grounds of divine law and morality. The command of the
Lord, which Moses executes, carries with it the weight of power
("Let my people go;/ If not I'll smite your first-born dead."), in
which God in His wrath shall seek retributive justice and punish
the enslavers. The commands bear as well the appeal of God's
righteousness ("When Israel was in Egyptland /Oppressed so hard
they could not stand/No more shall they in bondage toil/Let them
come out with Egypt's spoil . . ... "); through His grace He will
share the benefits of society with the enslaved in a form of dis-
tributive justice. The spiritual affirms that there is a righteous and
just morality displayed in God's justice and power, goodness and
love, and that that morality will operate against harsh, unfair legal
edicts. Whether it shall prevail is not addressed.
By means of its metaphorical core submerged in the novel, the
spiritual reiterates the conflicting codes within Faulkner's work.
It places in opposition an ideal standard and a legal standard for
evaluating human actions. On the one hand, Moses's attempt to
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lead the Israelites out of Egypt is right action not merely because
it promotes an ideal, freedom rather than bondage as the right
of human beings, whereas on the other hand, Pharaoh's attempt
to maintain the enslavement may be considered appropriate ac-
tion because it conforms to a civil law and the ethics of custom.
Yet enslavement is morally objectionable. The rightness of the
action or the goodness it achieves within the social order is over-
whelmed by the harm done to the Israelites and is negated ultimate-
ly by the divine command, "Let my people go."
In the final chapter, Gavin Stevens, lawyer and representative
of the legal system,"3 must confront the remainder of the old codes,
both racial and moral, in his involvement with the burial of the
outlaw, Samuel Worsham (Butch) Beauchamp. This burial must
be done in accordance with the wishes of two old women who
act not in response to the legal codes, but to moral codes, and
ironically to one set of racial codes as well. As Miss Worsham
says of Mollie, "'Mollie's ... parents belonged to my grandfather.
Mollie and I were born in the same month. We grew up as sisters.'"
Both the white woman and the black woman assume what the role
of whites must continue to be in the lives of blacks - that is,
paternalistic and, in part, moral response to the legacy of proper-
ty. This culture, Faulkner concludes by his depiction of Mollie
and Miss Worsham, has its limited but best hope in the women
who function outside of the dominant male codes of property, posi-
tion, and ownership.
The final alliance in the novel is primarily between these two
females, Mollie Worsham Beauchamp and Miss Worsham. As
a single older woman, who is also poor and without property,
Miss Worsham is dependent upon blacks for her livelihood; she
lives off the truck garden of Hamp, Mollie's brother. Her alliance
with Mollie does not argue strongly for an alliance between the
races that could move toward either social change or the com-
mon good, because Miss Worsham as a relic of the past is removed
from the present-day social order. Granted that the lawyer, Gavin
Stevens, and the editor of the newspaper, as well as some of the
townspeople and presumably Roth Edmonds, cooperate in pay-
ing for the return of Butch Beauchamp's body from Chicago and
for his burial, but in the final analysis, they act out of duty to
codes of conduct, primarily respect for the elderly white woman;
they act neither out of any faith or belief that attention to blacks
is ethical behavior, nor out of a belief that the law has functioned
43. Molly Beauchamp, "Mollie" in this final chapter, refers to the legal system as "the Law."
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to control and subordinate blacks. They fail to recognize that for
blacks the law has not primarily been a means of achieving justice,
and that the law is partly to blame for the condition of an "anti-
social" black, such as Butch Beauchamp who was not "properly"
socialized by the plantation system. In fact, the townspeople are
mainly quite content to believe that somehow Butch is merely the
bad son of a bad father, but not that the duality of legal, racial,
and moral codes followed by their society and which persistently
dehumanize blacks or undermine the ability of blacks to be or
to do may be equally responsible for what Butch becomes."
By insisting that Roth Edmonds sold her Benjamin (Butch)
into slavery, Mollie is only partly aware of the reality which faced
a young black man in a society still enmeshed in the old ways.
She herself is part of the traditional system as her and her brother
Hamp's relationship with Miss Worsham suggests. The very fact
that Mollie cannot be "Mrs. Beauchamp" or even "Miz
Beauchamp," as her white counterpart is always "Miss Worsham,"
reinforces the kind of lack of respect for black people that the
younger Butch may have been more keenly aware of. Though
Faulkner concludes that the North was in the early 1940's no bet-
ter than the South for a black youth because there Butch falls into
crime and is electrocuted, whereas in the South he is given a proper
burial, Faulkner does not and perhaps cannot, given the moral
vision of the novel, address the lack of opportunity for manhood
in the world into which Butch was born.
Unlike Lucas, who can claim direct descent from the anti-hero
L.Q.C. McCaslin, old Carothers, who was strong enough to take
the land and to hold it, Butch reaches majority at a point in the
1930's when the claim of white blood does not distinguish some
blacks from other blacks. It might be argued that Lucas was a
better man than his grandson Butch, yet it is apparent that, in the
context of the narrative, he is a better man in part because he is
McCaslin's grandson, not because of his blackness, which is on-
ly allowed the primacy of an older race, but not an equal one.
It is improbable that the young man Butch Worsham Beauchamp,
living not unlike his ancestors in earlier times on the McCaslin-
Edmonds place and working on shares, could be anything other
than entrapped and limited. When Butch, a victim of modem bond-
age to the land, commits crimes against the existing order, he
breaks laws that are necessary for the common good. At the same
time, his action of stealing from the plantation commissary may
44. This is not the subject taken up by Faulkner; it becomes the concern of another major writer from
Mississippi, Richard Wright.
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also be a form of rebellion against the existing codes and laws
that deny him access to property and ownership which define.
manhood and that relegate him and his kind to their "place." Just
as Butch's criminal activity cannot be condoned, neither can the
paternal, restricting social order into which he is born be con-
doned. Importantly, his death not only externalizes what Miss
Worsham labels as "our grief," the experience she shares with
Mollie and Hamp and from which Gavin Stevens is excluded, but
it also produces an opportunity for communal reflection and ac-
tion which includes the conscious mourners as well as the rest
of the society.
Ike, who has had the moral vision and the potenial for effec-
ting social change within the modern world of the denouement,
is finally an old man truncated by the inflexibility of his society
and his own rigidity. Right moral decisions have nonetheless
negated his moral impact. He does not even appear as a reference
in "Go Down, Moses." "'There are good men everywhere, at all
time,"' he tells his young kinsman Roth Edmonds in "Delta
Autumn." "'Most men are. Some are just unlucky, because most
are a little better than their circumstances give them a chance to
be."' But Roth replies, "'And you've lived almost eighty years.
... And that's what you've finally learned about the other animals
you live among. I suppose the question to ask you is, where have
you been all the time you were dead?'" Ike is, in a sense, figurative-
ly dead to his society, a condition which recalls the verse from
the spiritual "Go Down, Moses": "Let my people go;/If not I'll
smite your first-born dead."
While the major virtues Ike espouses are, as he himself indicates,
"pity and love of justice and of liberty," he does not act out of
love, out of love of abstractions, which remain abstract even
though moral. Thus, when a young black woman, who is a descen-
dant of Tennie's Jim, Lucas's brother and the grandson of Ike's
own grandfather, reveals that she is the mistress of Roth Edmonds
and the mother of his son, she realizes that Ike cannot respond
with love. She poses a crucial question: "'Old man ... have you
lived so long and forgotten so much that you dont remember
anything you ever knew or felt or even heard of love?"' The
answer, however, is not that Ike has forgotten, but rather that
he has not loved. The major burden of his heritage, its codes and
values, is the inability to love. "The way of love may be the only
way to justice,""' Reinhold Neibuhr states in his 1960 introduc-
45. R. Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (1960).
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tion to Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932). Without love,
Ike cannot attain the purity he seeks for himself, the justice he
desires for blacks, or the differentiation he needs from his grand-
father. He can forcefully resist evil in society only if he acts;
passivity is no solution, because it cannot generate a social refor-
mation. And within this novel, love becomes the most viable
motivational force allowing individuals, such as Lucas and Mollie
and Miss Worsham, to act according to "the dictates of the human
heart," as Faulkner put it in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech.
To be fully effective in his moral stance against the legal and racial
codes enslaving whites as well as blacks, Ike must, like Moses
in the spiritual, act and lead others to follow a higher authority
in defiance of unjust laws. To renounce Pharaoh's authority but
to leave the Israelites in bondage is not enough. Even limited ac-
tions such as those of Miss Worsham, Mollie, and Lucas argue
for the necessity of the human being to act, and to do so accord-
ing to a guiding moral authority that is higher than the cultural
norm.
Unfortunately, when Ike recognizes that Roth's mistress is, in
fact, black, not only does he once again offer money, but he also
compounds his offense by advising her to go North and marry
a black man: "'That's the only salvation for you - for a while
yet, maybe for a long while yet. We will have to wait."' He con-
cludes in a final admission of his helpless adherence to the racial
codes of his time and place: "'Get out of here! I can do nothing
for you! Cant nobody do nothing for you!"' Though he gives the
woman a boon of property for her son, Ike does not believe in
the equality of the races: "'You are young, handsome, almost
white; you could find a black man who would see in you what
you saw in him, who would ask nothing of you and expect less
and get even still less than that, if it's revenge you want."' Im-
plicit in his statement is the belief that Roth is the woman's superior
because he is white and that the woman will be the superior of
any black man because she is "almost white," and the even more
invidious belief that what she saw in Roth was his whiteness, his
race, just as any future black husband will see in her her almost-
whiteness, the visible sign of her almost-escape from an inferior
race. In one sense, property in the end is the property of blood;
the right to humanity is defined once more according to posses-
sion. Ike has not been able to translate his strong moral convic-
tions into social action, perhaps because the belief in property
and ownership is too ingrained in his community or perhaps
because his sense of individual justice, of renunciation and ex-
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piation by withdrawal, leaves him unengaged, suspended, and
isolated.
"A static being," Melvin Rader observes, "cannot be moral
because he is not confronted by choice. It is the temporal and ongo-
ing character of life that poses problems: our existence is charged
with concern because we must look before and after."' In this
last encounter between black and white descendants of L.Q.C.
McCaslin, Ike has become as static as his grandfather or his socie-
ty. His movement is inward and further away from the demands
of living in the world: "the territory in which game still existed
drawing yearly inwards as his life was drawing inward." He looks
backward not only to a time before ownership and possession and
property and law, but also to his own finest moment in the
wilderness with Sam Fathers and the bear; however, he cannot
go back, for Sam and the bear are dead, and the wilderness
destroyed by a new generation of Carothers McCaslins. His
memories and his models are not enough to foster new disciples;
his truth and his experience will die with him and the disappear-
ing wilderness. Ike's crying in the wilderness - not for what has
been lost, but for the moment of potential reformation that he has
been unable to sustain - will be to no avail. For him and for
his generation, there is no ameliorating vision accompanied by
action to untangle the knotty complexities of property and its prob-
lematical impact on white or black individuals.
46. M. Rader, Ethics and Society: An Appraisal of Social Ideals (1950).
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